The exchange of taxpayer-specific information between national tax authorities has recently emerged as a key and controversial topic in international tax policy discussions, most notably with the OECD's harmful tax practices project and the EU's savings tax initiative. This paper analyzes the effects of information exchange and withholding taxes, recognizing that countries which agree to exchange information do not forfeit the ability to levy withholding taxes, and also focusing in particular on the effects of innovative revenue-sharing arrangements. Amongst the findings are that: (i) the transfer of withholding tax receipts to the residence country, as planned in the European Union, has no effect on equilibrium tax rates, but acts purely as a lump-sum transfer; (ii) in contrast, allocating some of the revenue from information exchange to the source country-counter to usual practice (though no less so than the EU agreement)-would have adverse strategic effects on total revenue; (iii) nevertheless, any withholding tax regime is Pareto dominated by information exchange combined with appropriate revenue sharing; and, in particular, (iv) sharing of the additional revenues raised from information provided, while efficiency-reducing, could be in the interests of large countries as a means of persuading small countries to provide that information voluntarily.
Introduction
The exchange of taxpayer-specific information between national tax authorities, especially in relation to capital income, has emerged over the last few years as a (arguably, the) central issue in the discussion and formation of international tax policy. It is at the heart, in particular, of recent controversial and high-profile initiatives by both the OECD and the European Union (EU)-of which more later. The problem to which information exchange is addressed-the ease with which residence-based taxes on capital income can be escaped by depositing funds in low-tax jurisdictions and failing to declare the proceeds to the residence authorities 1 -is by no means new, though its practical importance is widely believed to have increased substantially as a consequence of reduced impediments to international capital movements. Until very recently, however, solutions to this problem have generally been sought, in both theory and practice, in raising the (withholding) tax rates set by low-tax jurisdictions. But political resistance to such interference in the setting of tax rates on capital income 2 has proved almost entirely overwhelming. Faced with these difficulties, attention has turned to the alternative strategy of encouraging countries to pass to the tax authorities of the residence country sufficient information for the latter to bring all the capital income of their residents into tax. This has the appeal of enabling the residence principle to be bolstered without infringing the sovereignty of any jurisdiction in setting its own tax rates.
Reflecting these considerations, two recent initiatives to establish more extensive information exchange than double tax treaty commitments provide for 3 have gathered far more political momentum than has any proposal for the coordination of rates or bases of taxation. The OECD's project to counter 'harmful tax practices' amongst both its own members and-more contentiously-non-members (initiated in 1998), 4 has ultimately come to be essentially an exercise in achieving effective information exchange. 5 And, to date, a successful one: 30 of the 35 jurisdictions originally identified as tax havens have now entered into commitments to provide information of this kind. In its work on the taxation of cross-border savings, the EU has also come to focus on effective information exchange. This has now resulted in agreement 6 that (from July 2005) 22 member states will implement automatic information exchange while the other three (Austria, Belgium, and Luxembourg) will instead adopt a withholding tax of at least 15 percent for the first three years, 20 percent for the next three years, and 35 percent thereafter. The EU savings tax directive has a further striking but little remarked-upon feature: those member states adopting withholding must transfer 75 percent of the revenue they collect to the country of residence.
There is, however, a fundamental difficulty to be faced in encouraging countries to adopt effective information exchange: while it is clear enough what high-tax countries have to gain, information exchange would seem to run counter to the interests of lowtax jurisdictions, as stressed by Tanzi and Zee (2001) . For by providing information to the home tax authorities that enables them to levy further tax, low-tax countries make themselves less attractive to foreign investors. Thus those tax havens that were induced to commit to effective information exchange under the 1998 OECD project did so with the prospect of OECD members adopting 'defensive measures' against them if they did not. There are of course ethical issues here: high-tax countries argue that in not providing information low-tax countries are conniving in what is often illegal non-payment of tax; low-tax countries respond that they cannot be held to blame if citizens of other countries choose to break foreign laws.
Leaving aside the possibility of compulsion-which can be politically very costly, and difficult to exercise against some of the more influential low-tax countries-the question arises as to whether information exchange can ever be-or be made to be-in the interests of all countries, and hence voluntarily adopted by all. That is a central concern of this paper.
The analytical literature on the international exchange of tax information remains relatively small, with contributions including Bacchetta and Espinosa (1995, 2000) , Eggert and Kolmar (2001 , 2002 , 2004 , Huizinga and Nielsen (2003) , and Keen and Ligthart (2005b) . These papers, especially the first, have identified one possible source of mutual benefit from information exchange: by diminishing the attractions of trying to escape domestic tax by saving abroad and concealing the proceeds, information exchange
